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Abstract. - In this paper, we study the information propagation in an empirical blogging network
by game-theoretical approach. The blogging network has small-world property and is scale-free.
Individuals in the blogosphere coordinate their decisions according to their idiosyncratic prefer-
ences and the choices of their neighbors. We find that corresponding to different initial conditions
and weights, the equilibrium frequency of discussions has a transition from high to low as a result
of the common interest in the topics specified by payoff matrices. Furthermore, under recommen-
dation, namely, individuals in blogging networks refer to additional bloggers’ resources besides
their nearest neighbors preferentially according to the popularity of the blogs, the whole blogging
network ultrafastly evolves into consensus state (absorbing state). Our results reflect the dynamic
pattern of information propagation in blogging networks.
Introduction. – Blog, which is short for “web log”,
has gained its ground by online community as a new mech-
anism for communication in recent years [1]. It is often a
personal journal maintained on the Web, which is eas-
ily and frequently updated by the blogger. In the past
few years, blogs are the fastest growing part of the World
Wide Web (WWW). Advanced social technologies lead
to change of the ways of people’s thinking and commu-
nicating. In the virtual space of blogs, which is usually
referred to as blogosphere, bloggers present their percep-
tion, life experience, ideas, etc, on their blogs, which is
instantly accessible and open to readers around the world
who can comment on the posts of other bloggers. This cre-
ates the eden of free minds and ideas to trigger sparks of
inspiration. Interestingly, the dynamic hierarchy of links
and recommendations generated by blogs creates power-
ful collaborative filtering effect to the tremendous infor-
mation flow travelling through the blogosphere everyday.
Therefore, the blogosphere provides an extraordinary on-
line laboratory to analyze how trends, ideas and informa-
tion travel through social communities. Further investi-
gation into the blogosphere will help understand not only
the dynamic pattern of information propagation in such
ecosystem, but also the collective behavior taking place
on such social networks.
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Much previous research investigating the phenomenon
of information propagation on networks has been done
by adopting classic Susceptible-Infected-Removed (SIR)
model in epidemiology [2–5]. Thinking about a rumor
spreading on social networks: first, an ignorant (I) ac-
quires the information from her/his neighbors and be-
comes a spreader (S). Finally, she/he loses interest about
the information and no longer spreads it again, and be-
comes a stifler (R). Accordingly, SIR models information
propagation in which the stiflers are never again suscepti-
ble to the information — just like conferring lifetime im-
munity. Yet, SIRS models the situation in which a stifler
eventually becomes susceptible again. For instance, in blo-
gosphere, the SIRS model can be interpreted as follows [6]:
a blogger who has not yet written about a topic is exposed
to the topic by reading the blog of a friend. She/he de-
cides to write about the topic, becoming infected. The
topic may then spread to readers of her/his blog. Later,
she/he may revisit the topic from a different perspective
and write about it again. Thus the life cycle of the topics
is analogous to the diseases’.
In the realm of sociology, extensive study of the diffu-
sion of innovation in social networks has been conducted
by examining the power of world of mouth in innovations
diffusion [6–8]. Generally speaking, there are two funda-
mental models describing the process by which nodes in
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networks adopt new ideas or innovations: threshold mod-
els and cascade models (see ref. [6] and references therein).
In this paper, we empirically investigate the dynamic
pattern of information propagation in blogosphere from
game-theoretical perspective. Individuals in the blogo-
sphere coordinate their decisions according to their id-
iosyncratic preferences and the choices of their neighbors.
Assume that individuals have two choices, A and B. The
payoff of an individual choosing A or B is composed of two
components: an individual and a social component. The
individual part comes from one’s preference irrespective of
others’ choices in the network while the social component
of payoff results from the mutual (reciprocal) choices of
individual neighbors. As a result of such a coordination
game, one adapts her/his strategy by imitation at each
time step, that is, follows the more successful strategy
measured by the payoff. Analogous to replicator dynam-
ics, after generations and generations, the system arrives
at equilibrium state. The dynamic behaviour of such pro-
cess of information propagation is affected significantly by
the blogging network structure. Thus we study the dy-
namics of information propagation empirically on a blog-
ging network which is collected by our WWW robot. The
dynamic pattern of information propagation as a result of
the common interest in the topics specified by different
payoff matrices is also observed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Sec. II deals with the blogging network data and explains
the model we adopt to study the information propagation
in blogosphere, and Sec. III gives out the results and makes
some explanations. Conclusions are made in Sec. IV.
The blogging network and the model. – Since
the global blogosphere has more than 20 million blogs,
we focused in our preliminary investigation on its sub-
community — the Chinese blogs hosted by Sina. We
viewed this sub-blogosphere as a close world, i.e., the links
outgoing of the Sina blog community were omitted. We
obtained a directed and connected blogging network con-
sisting of 7520 blogs’ sites which was crawled down by
our WWW robot. In fig. 1 and fig. 2, we report the
in- and out-degree distributions of the directed blogging
network. It is found that both in- and out-degree dis-
tributions obey power-law forms where P (kin) ∼ k
−γin
in
with γin = 2.13 ± 0.66, P (kout) ∼ k
−γout
out with γout =
2.28± 0.096. The average degree of our blogging network
〈kin〉 = 〈kout〉 = 8.42. We noticed that about 18.4% of
the blogs have no outgoing links to other blogs, but the
in-degree of each vertex in the blogging network is at least
one since our blogging network was crawled along the di-
rected links. The fraction of reciprocal edges (symmetric
links) is about 31%. The degree-dependent clustering co-
efficient C(k) is averaged over the clustering coefficient
of all degree k nodes. In fig. 3, we can see that for the
undirected blogging network, it is hard to declare a clear
power law in our case. Nevertheless, the nonflat cluster-
ing coefficient distributions shown in the figure suggests
that the dependency of C(k) on k is nontrivial, and thus
exhibits some degree of hierarchy in the network. Besides,
the average clustering coefficient of the undirected blog-
ging network is 0.46. The average shortest path length
〈l〉 = 4.28. Consequently, our blogging network has small-
world property and is scale-free. A detailed study of the
structure of the blogging network is presented in ref. [9].
Let us introduce the game-theoretical model by which
we study the information propagation on the empirical
blogging network. The social network can be represented
by a directed graph G consisting of a vertex set V and an
edge set E. Each vertex i represents a blogger i (her blogs
represents herself) in the blogosphere. A directed edge
e(i, j) from i to j indicates that j’s actions influence i’s
actions. Denote Γi as the neighbor set of vertices to which
node i’s outgoing edges connect. At each time step, each
individual has two choices: A and B corresponding to “not
to discuss the topic (No)” and “to write something on the
topic (Yes)” respectively. Let xi represent individual i’s
state (A or B). For convenience, the states are denoted
by the two-dimensional unit vectors,
A =
(
1
0
)
and B =
(
0
1
)
(1)
The individual’s choice depends upon the payoff result-
ing from one’s idiosyncratic preference and social influence
(trend). Therefore, the payoff of an individual choosing A
or B is composed of two components: an individual and a
social component. The individual part fi(xi) of the payoff
results from the intrinsic preference for A or B irrespective
of others. The social component of the payoff is depen-
dent on the externalities created by the choices of one’s
neighbors Γi. The social payoff is supposed to take the
form
∑
j∈Γi
xTi Mxj , where the sum is summed over all i’s
outgoing linked neighbors Γi. The payoff matrix M for
the two strategies A and B (the choices A and B can be
interpreted as) is:
A B
A a b
B c d
(2)
where a > c and d > b. This is a coordination game where
individuals should choose an identical action, whatever it
is, to receive high payoff. Hence matching the partner’s
choice is better off than not matching (a > c and d >
b). For simplicity, and without loss of the feature of the
coordination game, we set b = c = 0 and d = 1 − a with
0 < a < 1. Thus the rescaled payoff matrix is tuned by a
single parameter a. The payoff Pi of individual i is:
Pi = (1− w)fi(xi) + w
∑
j∈Γi
xTi Mxj (3)
where the weight w ∈ (0, 1) indicates the balance between
individual and social payoff. Here we use the strategy
update rule similar to imitation. In any one time step,
individual i adopts the choice A with probability propor-
tional to the total payoff of her/him and her/his neighbors
choosing A:
p-2
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Fig. 1: (Color online) The in-degree distribution P (kin) obeys
a power-law P (kin) ∼ k
−γin
in with γin = 2.13± 0.66. The line’s
slope is −2.13 for comparison with the distribution.
Wxi←A =
∑
j∈SA
i
Pj∑
j∈{i∪Γi}
Pj
(4)
where SAi = {k|k ∈ {i ∪ Γi} and xk = A}. Otherwise,
individual i adopts B with probability 1 −Wxi←A. This
update rule is in essential “following the crowd” in which
the individuals are influenced by their neighbors and learn
from local payoff information of their nearest neighbors.
Within this imitation circumstance, the individual tends
to keep up with the social trend based upon the payoff
information gathered from local neighbors.
Results and discussions. – We consider the infor-
mation propagation on the blogging network when some
bloggers are initially selected at random as seeds for dis-
cussing some certain specified topic in their blogs. All
the bloggers are assumed to be identical in their interests
and preferences, thus the individual part of payoff func-
tion fi(xi) is identical for all i. For simplicity, we set
f(A) = 0.4 and f(B) = 0.5 in our simulations (the same
magnitude as 0 < a < 1). In this situation, bloggers pref-
erentially discuss the topic in their blogs, hence we can
examine the world-of-mouth effect in blogosphere empir-
ically. In addition, all individuals are influenced by their
outgoing linked neighbors. Individual i’s social payoff is
summed over her/his all outgoing edges in which she/he
compares her/his choice with her/his friends’ and obtains
payoff according to the payoff matrix of eq. (2). The syn-
chronous updating rule is adapted here. At each time step,
each blogger updates her/his decision whether to discuss
or not according to eq. (4). All bloggers in the blogosphere
are assumed to coordinate their choices to their friends
(whose blogs the outgoing links are connected to), because
conformity with friends in choices leads to the solid basis
to communicate and enjoy the fun of the topics. Equilib-
rium frequencies of discussions were obtained by average
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Fig. 2: (Color online) The out-degree distribution P (kout) fol-
lows a power-law P (kout) ∼ k
−γout
out with γout = 2.28 ± 0.096.
The slope of the straight line is −2.28 for comparison with the
distribution.
over 100 generations after a transient time of 5000 gener-
ations. The evolution of the frequency of discussions as a
function of a and w has been computed corresponding to
different initial conditions. Furthermore, each data point
results from averaging over 10 runs for the same parame-
ters.
We present the results of equilibrium frequency of dis-
cussions as a function of the parameter space (a, w) corre-
sponding to different initial conditions in fig. 4. The den-
sity of discussions is indicated by the color bar. It is found
that the initial fraction of discussers affects the equilibrium
results quantitatively. In fig. 4, for a), b), c) panels respec-
tively, there is a clear transition from high to low for fixed
w when a is increased from 0 to 1. As aforementioned, the
payoff matrix element a indicates the common interest in
the topic travelling in the blogosphere, that is, when a is
near zero, bloggers in the blogosphere show high interest
in the topic and would like to write something about the
topic; while a is near one, it means that people lose in-
terest in the topic, and reluctant to discuss. Besides, the
weight w also plays a role in equilibrium results. When
w approaches to zero, namely, individuals neglect the so-
cial influence and only depend upon individual preference
to discuss or not. While w tends to one, individuals are
completely influenced by their friends regardless of their
own idiosyncratic preferences. Otherwise, for intermedi-
ate w, i.e., the choices are balanced between their individ-
ual preference and social influence, the “self-organized”
bloggers perform in a collective way that without a center
control most of the individuals in the blogosphere change
conformably from frequently discussing the topic to losing
interest in the topic as a increases from zero to one. More-
over, the critical value ac of a at which the frequency of
discussions transits from high to low is affected by the ini-
tial fraction of discussers. It is observed that for interme-
p-3
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Fig. 3: (Color online) The plot of degree-dependent clustering
coefficient C(k) versus degree k in undirected blogging network.
diate weight w, the critical values of ac are around 0.1, 0.3,
and 0.5 corresponding to the initial fractions of discussers
1%, 21%, and 51% respectively. Thus although the initial
condition influences the equilibrium result, different initial
conditions do not change the equilibrium results qualita-
tively. In other words, for fixed weightw and certain initial
condition, the density of discussions has a clear transition
from high to low when a increases from 0 to 1. We show
the frequency of discussions fd vs a for w = 0.66 and 21%
of initial discussions in fig. 5. The frequency of discussions
decreases from around 84% to 4% with increasing a. The
transition happens around ac = 0.3. Interestingly, we find
that there are about 18.4% bloggers have no outgoing links
at all. Hence, their states keep invariant because their de-
cisions are not affected by neighbors. Accordingly, the
whole blogosphere can never evolve into absorbing states
in which all individuals make the same choice A or B. The
typical evolution of frequency of discussions with respect
to time corresponding to different a with w = 0.66, initial
condition 21% is shown in fig. 6. With a = 0.11, the bl-
ogosphere quickly evolves into the truncated equilibrium
state where the frequency of discussion often drops down
and recovers to previous level after a while. Near the crit-
ical value of ac with a = 0.31, the frequency of discussions
is decreased at first. Yet, it strives to achieve the high
level very soon and is retained small fluctuations around
the equilibrium state. When a is increased to 0.41, the
frequency of discussions descends quickly, and then oscil-
lates around the equilibrium state. With a = 0.81, the
frequency of discussions fluctuates with some “spikes”—
occasionally, it suddenly erupted from 4% to 8%. There-
fore, these results shown in fig. 6 can to some extent reflect
the dynamic pattern of information propagation in the real
blogosphere. When most bloggers show great enthusiasm
in the topic (when a is near zero), they extensively dis-
cuss the topic in their blogs. For example, the fraction of
the bloggers talking about “Microsoft” in computer com-
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Fig. 5: (Color online) The frequency of discussions as a function
of a corresponding to w = 0.66 and initial condition 21%.
munity is sustained at high value, even though there are
often small fluctuations around the equilibrium state. And
yet, when all individuals have low interest in discussing the
topic (when a is near one), they are reluctant to mention it
in their blogs. For instance, the discussion of “influenza”,
is rare at non-influenza season, but bursts out in influenza
season. Consequently, being consistent with the dynamic
pattern of information propagation in real world, our re-
sults demonstrate that the frequency of discussions has a
transition from high to low due to the common interest
specified by the payoff matrix for different weights w and
initial conditions.
In order to investigate the role of recommendation to in-
formation propagation in blogosphere, we consider a mod-
ified model based upon the above one. In blogging com-
munity, the system often recommends some recent posts
on its main page. Thus the recommended posts are the in-
formation resources which are noticeable for the bloggers
to acquire. In addition, when bloggers surf in the blogo-
sphere, the probability a blog being visited is proportional
to its in-degree. Therefore, for simplicity, we assume that
besides the neighbors to which the blog outgoing links con-
nect, each blogger refers to additional K blogs which are
chosen with probability proportional to their in-degrees,
i.e., the probability pij that individual i chooses j’s blog
(j * Γi) as information reference is,
pij = k
in
j /
∑
l
kinl (5)
Since each blogger independently chooses K blogs accord-
ing to the probability proportional to in-degree, the cho-
sen K blogs of each blogger might be different. All the
individuals are influenced by both their neighbors and the
additional K blogs. Let Ai denote the K blogs individual
i chooses. The payoff Pi of individual i becomes,
Pi = (1 − w)fi(xi) + w
∑
j∈{Γi∪Ai}
xTi Mxj (6)
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Fig. 4: (Color online) The frequency of discussions as a function of the parameter space (a,w). Panel a), b), c) correspond to
the initial conditions 1%, 21%, 51% respectively.
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Fig. 6: (Color online) Panel a), b), c) and d) show the evolution of discussions corresponding to a = 0.11, 0.31, 41, 0.81
respectively. The weight w is fixed as 0.66 and 21% of the bloggers are initially selected as seeds.
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Fig. 7: (Color online) The evolution of discussions when indi-
viduals choose additional K blogs proportional to the in-degree
as references. Left panel a) shows the case with a = 0.11, and
b) with a = 0.81. The weight w is 0.51, K = 10, and 21% of
the bloggers are initially selected as seeds.
And the according update rule is,
Wxi←A =
∑
j∈SA
i
Pj∑
j∈{i∪Γi∪Ai}
Pj
(7)
where SAi = {k|k ∈ {i ∪ Γi ∪ Ai} and xk = A}.
The corresponding results are shown in figs. 7, 8. Fig. 7
shows the evolution of frequency of discussions with K =
10, w = 0.51 and initial condition 21%. With a = 0.11,
the whole blogosphere ultrafastly evolves into absorbing
state where all bloggers discuss the topic in their blogs
(see fig. 7(a)). While for a = 0.81, all individuals choose
not to mention the topic at all (see fig. 7(b)). By contrast,
without the recommendation, the whole blogosphere can
never evolve into collective consensus (see figs. 4, 5, 6 for
comparison). In fig. 8, we can see that the frequency of
discussions transits from one to zero as a increases from 0
to 1. As a result, under recommendation, the blogosphere
quickly attains the consensus state in which all bloggers
make the same choices A or B. Herein, the selected (rec-
ommended) blogs act as leaders influencing other bloggers.
Dependent upon the local information Γi and global infor-
mation Ai, individuals finally achieve conformity of their
choices. Therefore, our result may shed light on under-
standing the collective behaviour in the blogosphere.
Conclusion remarks. – To sum up, we have inves-
tigated information propagation on an empirical social
network, the blogging network, by game-theoretical ap-
proach. The blogging network is a good representative of
real social networks which have small-world property and
are scale-free. We found that for different weight w and
initial conditions, the frequency of discussions has a tran-
sition from high to low resulting from the common interest
specified by the payoff matrix. To some extent, our results
reflect the dynamic pattern of information propagation in
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Fig. 8: (Color online) The frequency of discussions as a function
of a corresponding to w = 0.51, K = 10 and initial condition
21%.
blogosphere. Moreover, under the circumstance of rec-
ommendation, the recommended blogs based on their in-
degrees act as leaders influencing other bloggers. Hence,
the whole blogosphere evolves into absorbing states where
all bloggers achieve the consensus of choices. Based upon
local information Γi and limited global information Ai, in-
dividual i finally collectively synchronizes her choice with
others. Therefore, our results may help understand the
collective behaviours of bloggers in the blogosphere.
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